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 Dworkin=s Perfectionism 
 
 James E. Fleming & Linda C. McClain1 
 
 
I. Ronald Dworkin: A Eulogy 
 
Ronald Dworkin is widely and rightly viewed as the most important legal philosopher 
and constitutional theorist of our time and as one of the leading figures in moral and political 
philosophy. In the words of Marshall Cohen, Dworkin=s jurisprudential writings Aconstitute the 
finest contribution yet made by an American writer to the philosophy of law.@2 And Cohen wrote 
those words when Dworkin published his first book, Taking Rights Seriously, in 1977! His many 
outstanding subsequent books and articles made good on that early, prescient assessment. 
Dworkin is unmatched and unrivaled in legal philosophy and constitutional theory. 
In the words of T.M. Scanlon, Dworkin is Aour leading public philosopher.@3 He regularly 
published essays on legal and political subjects in the New York Review of Books from 1968 
through 2013. Like many readers, we eagerly opened each issue hoping to find a new piece by 
Dworkin. We shall miss that. Dworkin had the rare gift of being able to write abstractly in legal 
philosophy and constitutional theory yet also to write accessibly for the general educated citizen. 
He brought out the issues of moral and political principle at the heart of the major political and 
constitutional issues of the day. His writing not only bristles with brilliant insights but also 
exhorts and uplifts. Moreover, in courageous and spirited exchanges with leading conservatives, 
like Richard Posner, Robert Bork, and Antonin Scalia, he gave as good as he got and then some!4 
Over the years, one of us (Fleming) has organized a number of conferences in 
constitutional theory and Dworkin was often the most appropriate keynote speaker. In 
conferences at Fordham University School of Law on AFidelity in Constitutional Interpretation@ 
and ARawls and the Law@ and at Boston University School of Law on his book, Justice for 
Hedgehogs, Dworkin delivered powerful and eloquent keynote lectures.5 The readers of this 
book are likely familiar with the countless accounts of Dworkin=s brilliance as a lecturer: of how 
he spoke without notes and with great flair, making it all seem so graceful and effortless. Even 
more impressive, in our experience, was how seriously he took his lectures and how 
energetically he responded to his interlocutors. In the conference at Boston University on Justice 
for Hedgehogs, held when Dworkin was 78 years old, he demonstrated his characteristic energy 
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by responding extemporaneously to all 31 commentators, one panel at a time, and elaborating 
those initial thoughts in a published response.6 One of us had the privilege of writing the 
biographical entry on Dworkin in the Yale Biographical Dictionary of American Law, and closed 
that entry by stating: AHis work abounds with indefatigable energy, giving the impression that he 
will not stop making arguments until he has put the clamps of reason upon every rational 
being.@7 
Dworkin=s famous Colloquium in Legal, Political, and Social Philosophy at New York 
University (with Tom Nagel and sometimes Jeremy Waldron) set the standard for rigorous, 
vigorous, and constructive dialogue concerning important scholarship in those fields. Many other 
colloquia have been modeled upon it, but none has equaled it. Dworkin, Nagel, and Waldron 
gave incisive summaries of the works being presented, asked apt questions, and pressed probing 
and constructive criticisms. The command and vigor with which they did so was an inspiration to 
all who presented work in the Colloquium and to all who participated. One of us (McClain) 
benefitted both from the formative experience of being a student in the Colloquium and, years 
later, from receiving the generous input of Dworkin and Nagel when presenting a paper in the 
Colloquium.8 
Dworkin=s work in legal philosophy and constitutional theory was so powerful and 
fecund that it could inspire many careers wholly dedicated to building upon it and working out 
its implications. Dworkin (along with John Rawls) has been a powerful inspiration for our own 
work in constitutional theory. Fleming=s Securing Constitutional Democracy: The Case of 
Autonomy puts forward a AConstitution-perfecting theory@ that aims, in the spirit of Dworkin, to 
interpret the American Constitution so as to make it the best it can be.9 Sotirios Barbers=s and 
Fleming=s book, Constitutional Interpretation: The Basic Questions, is a response to Dworkin=s 
call, in Taking Rights Seriously, for a Afusion of constitutional law and moral theory.@10 Our 
book, Ordered Liberty: Rights, Responsibilities, and Virtues, responds to charges that liberals 
like Dworkin Atake rights [too] seriously,@ developing a civic liberalism that takes 
responsibilities and civic virtues B as well as rights B seriously.11 And Fleming’s recent book, 
Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution: For Moral Readings and Against Originalisms, joins 
Dworkin in defending a moral reading or philosophic approach to constitutional interpretation 
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over and against all forms of originalism.12 Finally, in evaluating new decisions by the United 
States Supreme Court and addressing new challenges, McClain has found it fruitful to ask: 
“What would Dworkin do?” or “What would Dworkin say?”13  
Dworkin=s successor as Professor of Jurisprudence at Oxford University, John Gardner, 
put it well when he said: AThe loss of Ronnie takes a bit of the sparkle out of life as a philosopher 
of law.@14 But those who knew Dworkin and learned from his teaching and writing will never 
forget the thrill of engaging with him and building upon his work. His sparkling prose, the 
staggering ambition and monumental achievements of his works, and the flair and gusto of his 
arguments and insights will never cease to illuminate and inspire. We shall not look upon his like 
again. Ronald Dworkin made legal philosophy and constitutional theory the best they can be. 
In this essay, we shall interpret Dworkin=s constitutional theory in light of three varieties 
of perfectionism: (1) the idea that government should undertake a formative project of 
inculcating civic virtues and encouraging responsibility in the exercise of rights; (2) the idea that 
we should interpret the American Constitution so as to make it the best it can be; and (3) the idea 
that we should defend a Constitution-perfecting theory that would secure not only procedural 
liberties essential for democratic self-government but also substantive liberties essential for 
personal self-government. We shall identify three gaps left by Dworkin=s work and sketch how 
we have sought to fill those gaps in the spirit of his work through developing a mild form of 
constitutional perfectionism. 
II. Taking Not Only Rights But Also Responsibilities and Virtues Seriously 
First, there is perfectionism in political philosophy as it might be applied to constitutional 
theory. In criticizing perfectionism in constitutional theory, Cass Sunstein states that “[t]he 
perfectionist approach to constitutional law should not be confused with perfectionism in 
political philosophy,” citing John Rawls, Political Liberalism.15 Rawls distinguishes between 
political liberalism and perfectionist liberalism (as well as perfectionist political philosophies 
more generally): Perfectionists of all stripes generally believe that statecraft is soulcraft, and that 
the state must inculcate civic virtues or even moral excellence in the citizenry. Despite Sunstein=s 
remark, we should acknowledge the variety of constitutional perfectionism that brings 
perfectionist political philosophy to bear on constitutional theory. The two best examples are the 
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work of Sotirios A. Barber16 and that of Michael J. Sandel.17 On Barber=s view, we ultimately 
must face up to the challenge of “supplying . . . the defect of better motives,” not just by relying 
upon checks and balances and making “[a]mbition . . . counteract ambition” B James Madison=s 
strategy in The Federalist No. 5118 B but also by inculcating civic virtues that are necessary for 
responsible citizenship and for the success of the constitutional order. Similarly, Sandel argues 
not only that government should undertake such a formative project but also that in justifying 
constitutional rights like privacy, we should make recourse to substantive moral goods or virtues 
and a conception of justice as cultivating virtues. In our book, Ordered Liberty, we embrace a 
mild form of perfectionist constitutional theory along these lines.19 Strikingly, although Dworkin 
rejected Rawls=s political liberalism in favor of a comprehensive ethical liberalism, and he 
recognized considerable latitude for governmental encouragement of responsibility in the 
exercise of rights, he never fully developed a perfectionist theory of governmental responsibility 
to inculcate civic virtues. 
A. Respecting Freedom and Cultivating Virtues 
Dworkin, alongside Rawls, is the leading contemporary proponent of a liberal conception 
of justice.20 As Sandel interprets these liberals, they think about justice in terms of respecting 
freedom as distinguished from maximizing welfare or cultivating virtues.21 Sandel himself is the 
leading civic republican critic of such liberal conceptions of justice, interpreting them as holding 
(1) that law should be neutral concerning competing conceptions of virtue or the best way to live 
and (2) that Aa just society respects each person=s freedom to choose his or her conception of the 
good life.@22 And he is the most prominent civic republican proponent of conceiving justice in 
terms of cultivating virtues. Nonetheless, we want to point out some notable and unexpected 
affinities between Dworkin=s and Sandel=s conceptions of justice as put forward respectively in 
Justice for Hedgehogs and Justice: What=s the Right Thing to Do? 
First, in Justice for Hedgehogs, Dworkin rejects neutrality and criticizes Rawls=s political 
liberalism for bracketing conceptions of the good life in arguments about justice.23 Instead, 
Dworkin defends a comprehensive ethical liberalism and argues for the integration of ethics, 
morality, and justice.24 He introduces two ethical principles that Astate fundamental requirements 
of living well@: 
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The first is a principle of self-respect. Each person must take his own life 
seriously: he must accept that it is a matter of importance that his life be a 
successful performance rather than a wasted opportunity. The second is a 
principle of authenticity. Each person has a special, personal responsibility for 
identifying what counts as success in his own life; he has a personal responsibility 
to create that life through a coherent narrative or style that he himself endorses. 
 
He concludes: ATogether the two principles offer a conception of human dignity.@25 Dworkin 
develops two related political principles, arguing that A[n]o government is legitimate unless it 
subscribes to two reigning principles@: AFirst, it must show equal concern for the fate of every 
person over whom it claims dominion. Second, it must respect fully the responsibility and right 
of each person to decide for himself how to make something valuable of his life.@26 So, too, 
Sandel criticizes Rawls=s political liberalism, arguing that we cannot separate arguments about 
justice from arguments about competing conceptions of the good life and of the virtues that a 
good society should promote.27 
Second, in Justice for Hedgehogs, Dworkin is concerned to articulate the right process of 
moral reasoning. In doing so, he looks back to Aristotle for an example of a holistic approach to 
such reasoning and also looks to the relationship between questions of the good life and those of 
the good polity.28 So, too, Sandel turns to Aristotle for a virtue-centered approach that integrates 
moral reasoning about justice with reasoning about moral virtues and conceptions of the good 
life.29 
Third, in Justice for Hedgehogs, Dworkin explains that the idea of Aliving well” means 
“creating not just a chronology but a narrative that weaves together values of character B 
loyalties, ambitions, desires, tastes, and ideals.@30 Sandel has long criticized views like 
Dworkin=s as forms of Avoluntarist@ liberalism that conceive the person as a freely choosing, 
Aunencumbered self@ who is the Aauthor@ of his or her own ends and who can stand apart from 
relationships and commitments.31 Yet in Justice, Sandel, like Dworkin, stresses the importance 
of a Anarrative quest that aspires to a certain unity or coherence@32 and contends that we are 
Astorytelling beings@ and Awe live our lives as narrative quests.@33 
Finally, in Justice for Hedgehogs, just as in Life=s Dominion, Dworkin argues not only for 
Ataking rights seriously,@ but also for Ataking responsibilities seriously.@34 Dworkin stands in 
contrast to other forms of liberalism grounded in the idea that the state must be neutral between 
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competing conceptions of the good life and the idea that rights insulate right-holders from moral 
judgments about their exercise. Rather, Dworkin argues that the state may encourage people to 
exercise their rights responsibly, short of compelling them to do what the government thinks is 
the responsible thing to do.35 Sandel, much like Dworkin, has criticized those very liberal 
conceptions of neutrality and of rights as insulating right-holders from moral judgments.36  
And so, we must ask, are Dworkin=s comprehensive ethical liberalism and Sandel=s 
perfectionist civic republicanism as far apart as Sandel=s criticisms of liberal conceptions of 
justice might lead us to expect? In other work, we have suggested that the contrasts between 
justice as respecting freedom and justice as cultivating virtues are not as stark as Sandel has put 
them. The work of some liberal political theorists, most prominently William Galston and 
Stephen Macedo, has narrowed the distance between these two conceptions. These theorists have 
developed attractive conceptions of civic liberalism, arguing persuasively that liberalism has a 
proper concern with cultivating civic virtues.37 We too work on this terrain of civic liberalism in 
our book, Ordered Liberty.38 
We shall suggest that the convergences between Dworkin, on the one hand, and the civic 
liberals and civic republicans, on the other, are closer with respect to recognizing considerable 
latitude for governmental promotion of responsible exercise of rights than they are with respect 
to recognizing the need for governmental inculcation of civic virtues. That is, Dworkin 
developed a theory of taking not only rights but also responsibilities seriously, but he for the 
most part eschewed developing a perfectionist project of cultivating civic virtues.  
B. Taking Responsibilities as well as Rights Seriously  
In Life=s Dominion, Dworkin propounds a notably Amoralized@ liberalism, making moral 
arguments for the right to procreative autonomy and the right to die while defending the 
authority of government to moralize concerning persons= exercise of these rights. He writes that 
America=s political heritage is characterized by Atwo sometimes competing traditions:@ AThe first 
is the tradition of personal freedom. The second assigns government responsibility for guarding 
the public moral space in which all citizens live.@ Dworkin continues: AA good part of 
constitutional law consists in reconciling these two ideas.@ And he asks: AWhat is the appropriate 
balance in the case of abortion?@39 
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This passage may have surprised many readers, both critics and allies, for two basic 
reasons. First, critics who associate liberals like Dworkin with exaltation of the tradition of 
personal freedom may be heartened that he acknowledges the legitimacy of the tradition that 
assigns government responsibility for guarding the public moral space. And allies who celebrate 
personal freedom may be alarmed that he sanctions governmental protection of the moral or 
ethical environment. (Scanlon, a friendly liberal ally, conceded that liberals including Dworkin 
have not talked very much about the latter tradition or about government promoting respect for 
intrinsic values like the sanctity of life. Indeed, he found Dworkin=s reference to Amaintaining a 
moral environment@ a Aslightly surprising phrase.@40) 
Second, critics and allies commonly associate Dworkin with the notion of Arights as 
trumps@ and thus with the idea that Ataking rights seriously@ practically precludes reconciling 
rights with, or balancing rights against, governmental concern for the guarding the public moral 
space.41 Indeed, some readers might have expected a book by Dworkin on the right of 
procreative autonomy and the right to die to defend these rights solely on the basis of an 
argument about personal freedom. And they might have expected Dworkin to argue that these 
rights trump the very concerns regarding the moral or ethical environment that he here 
acknowledges as part of the American political heritage and constitutional law. 
Dworkin=s recognition of the place of the second tradition in the American political 
heritage is significant. Both as a matter of fit with American constitutional precedents and 
practice and as a matter of a plausible conception of government=s proper authority, Dworkin is 
right to recognize that there are legitimate channels through which government may seek to 
promote the moral or ethical environment. At the same time, there is no denying that this 
tradition has been invoked to try to justify appalling deprivations of freedom and equality, for 
example censorship of great works of literature and prohibition of interracial marriage.42 For this 
reason, it is understandable that many liberals have sought to deny, avoid, or eradicate this 
tradition. Yet Dworkin is right to see that the risks of this tradition do not justify rejecting it 
entirely. Instead, he attempts to work with, and to work within, this tradition and to make it safe 
for liberals and for fundamental principles of freedom and equality, together with commitments 
to equal concern and dignity. 
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In Justice for Hedgehogs, in a passage concerning restricting liberty, Dworkin asks: 
AWhy should [the majority] not be permitted to protect the religious and sexual culture it 
favors...?@ He answers: 
We need arguments like those of this book B the distinctions and 
interconnections among responsibility, authenticity, influence, and subordination 
that we have reviewed B properly to answer that question. The second principle of 
dignity makes ethics special: it limits the acceptable range of collective decision. 
We cannot escape the influence of our ethical environment: we are subject to the 
examples, exhortations, and celebrations of other people=s ideas about how to live. 
But we must insist that that environment be created under the aegis of ethical 
independence: that it be created organically by the decisions of millions of people 
with the freedom to make their own choices, not through political majorities 
imposing their decisions on everyone.43 
 
There clearly will be limits on government=s protection of the ethical environment.  
Dworkin=s arguments for rights in both Life=s Dominion and Justice for Hedgehogs are 
grounded, not in governmental neutrality or in personal autonomy, but in a deontology of state 
conduct. In other words, Dworkin advances a theory that derives from a conception of the 
permissible bases for collective decisions. His concern is with respecting limits on the grounds 
for governmental decisions and with avoiding political majorities imposing their decisions on 
everyone concerning questions such as how to live or how best to respect the sanctity of life.44 
Dworkin specifically denied that he was articulating a theory of rights that asks what our 
fundamental or especially important interests are and what freedoms are necessary to secure or 
further those interests.45 For example, despite Dworkin=s justification for a right of procreative 
autonomy, his theory differs in important respects from a theory of autonomy rooted in a 
conception of the person and what is necessary for the development and exercise of moral 
powers or the like. In this respect, his theory differs from the Rawlsian civic liberal theory of 
deliberative autonomy that we have developed and applied in Securing Constitutional 
Democracy, The Place of Families, and Ordered Liberty.46 
This feature of Dworkin=s theory in part accounts for why he contemplated a relatively 
large space (compared to most liberals) for governmental moralizing. On his view, there is a 
large space between complete, hands-off noninterference with liberty, autonomy, dignity, 
independence, or choice (of the sort strong autonomy theorists advocate) and coercion. 
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Furthermore, government need not, and should not, be neutral in that large space. It may 
moralize, encourage responsibility, and the like, so long as it does not coerce the ultimate 
decision.47 Likewise, citizens need not, and should not, be neutral.  
At the same time, this feature of Dworkin=s theory may help explain why he did not 
develop a civic liberalism concerned to inculcate civic virtues or to develop the moral powers or 
capacities for responsible democratic and personal self-government. And why he did not put 
forward a theory of civic education or of the roles of government and civil society in preparing 
persons for responsible citizenship and orderly social reproduction. In our book, Ordered 
Liberty, we have elaborated a mild form of civic liberal perfectionism that takes up these 
projects. It aims to take civic virtues B along with rights and responsibilities B seriously. We 
think our view is not incompatible with Dworkin=s ethical liberalism, even if he himself did not 
develop such a theory. 
III. Making the Moral Reading of the American Constitution the Best It Can Be 
A. Interpretive Perfectionism 
Second, we distinguish perfectionism in the sense of a theory of constitutional 
interpretation entailing that we should interpret the Constitution so as to make it the best it can 
be.48 On this view, as Sunstein puts it, constitutional interpretation is a matter of putting the 
existing legal materials “in their best constructive light,” or of making them “the best they can 
be.”49 Furthermore, it is the quest for the interpretation that provides the best fit with and 
justification of the constitutional document and underlying constitutional order.50 This sense of 
perfectionism B which we might call “interpretive perfectionism” B is famously associated with 
Dworkin. We embrace this sense. 
Dworkin=s interpretive perfectionism takes the form of the “moral reading” of the 
American Constitution: the Constitution embodies abstract moral principles rather than laying 
down particular historical conceptions, and interpreting and applying those principles require 
fresh judgments of political theory about how they are best understood.51 Dworkin=s 
development of the moral reading makes it sound (1) more utopian and (2) more philosophical 
than it should. Therefore, he triggers objections that he propounds (1) a theory of the “perfect 
Constitution”52 and (2) a theory that entails that judges should be philosophers.53 To be fair to 
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Dworkin, he does not claim that the moral reading is a moral realist reading: a reading that is 
prior to and independent of our own political and constitutional order and practice, and true to 
the moral order of the universe.54 Rather, he contends that the moral reading is constrained by 
the requirements of fit and integrity: thus, it is bound to account for the legal materials of the 
existing constitutional order and practice.55 And so, even if Dworkin=s theory of constitutional 
interpretation aims to provide the best interpretation of these legal materials B to make the 
Constitution the best it can be B it is not unbounded. 
Nonetheless, some critics charge that Dworkin=s moral reading is utopian in two senses. 
One, it is a moral reading for a perfect liberal utopia: he would interpret the American 
Constitution to protect every right and produce every outcome that his liberal political 
philosophy would entail. And two, it is literally a theory for no place: he would give the same 
moral reading irrespective of the actual history and practice of the constitutional scheme, for 
example, the same for Britain as for the United States. We do not believe that such critics are 
right about Dworkin=s moral reading, but they certainly are persistent and warrant a fuller 
response than simply directing them to read Dworkin more carefully. 
When confronted with the “perfect Constitution” challenge,56 Dworkin basically pleaded 
(we paraphrase): “I do not believe the American Constitution is perfect. For example, while I do 
believe that justice requires welfare rights, I do not believe that the Constitution protects such 
rights.” To continue our paraphrase: “Your challenge applies to Frank Michelman B not me B 
because he B not I B believes that the Constitution does protect welfare rights.”57 Beyond that, 
Dworkin was at pains to make clear, as noted above, that the constraints of fit and integrity entail 
that the actual Constitution is imperfect when measured against the standards of any normative 
political philosophy or conception of justice. 
Our tack here for responding to the perfect Constitution challenge to Dworkin=s moral 
reading is to show how Lawrence G. Sager=s justice-seeking account of American constitutional 
practice helps meet the challenge, in particular, through its accounts of the thinness of 
constitutional justice and more particularly of the moral shortfall of judicially enforceable 
constitutional law. Sager argues that certain constitutional principles required by justice are 
judicially underenforced, yet nonetheless may impose affirmative obligations outside the courts 
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on legislatures, executives, and citizens generally to realize them more fully.58 Sager=s view is an 
important component of a full moral reading or justice-seeking account of the Constitution. For 
it helps make sense of the evident thinness or moral shortfall of constitutional law. For example, 
instead of saying that the American Constitution does not secure welfare rights B the move that 
Dworkin makes B Sager says that the Constitution does secure welfare rights, but it leaves their 
enforcement in the first instance to legislatures and executives.59 Once a scheme of welfare 
rights and benefits is in place, courts have a secondary role in enforcing it equally and fairly.60 
Furthermore, if Dworkin=s moral reading of the American Constitution, though it 
embodies abstract moral principles, does not incorporate all of the important principles of 
justice, we need an account of the difference between the two. Because Dworkin does not offer 
such an account, he may leave his readers wondering whether his theory entails that the 
American Constitution is a perfect liberal Constitution. To be sure, the constraints of fit and 
integrity entail a gap between the Constitution and justice. But Dworkin says little about any 
such gap, and what he does say implies that the gap may be narrow. For example, he says that 
the Constitution is abstract, and therefore it should come as no surprise that any right we can 
argue for as a matter of political morality we can also argue for as a matter of constitutional 
law.61 And where he does acknowledge a significant gap between the Constitution and justice, 
for example, with welfare rights, he does not provide a general account of why the Constitution 
as he conceives it does not incorporate elements of justice like welfare rights. 
Sager=s account of the domain of constitutional justice helps in this regard. He 
distinguishes (1) judicially enforceable constitutional law from (2) constitutional justice, which 
he in turn distinguishes from (3) political justice and (4) morality generally.62 Imagine a series of 
progressively thicker concentric circles representing these four domains. Dworkin=s highly 
general formulation of the “moral reading” may seem to blur the distinction between 
constitutional law and constitutional justice, as well as that between constitutional justice and 
political justice, and indeed that between constitutional law, on the one hand, and political justice 
and morality generally, on the other. His “hedgehogist” commitment to the integration of ethics, 
morality, and justice may further blur those distinctions. Sager=s justice-seeking account 
underscores just how thin a moral reading of the Constitution has to be B as compared to our 
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thicker conceptions of political justice and morality B in order to be credible as an account of 
American constitutional practice. 
Sager=s underenforcement thesis may entail a conception of legislative responsibility 
congenial to the conception that Dworkin=s early work promised but never fully provided. We 
refer to the “doctrine of political responsibility” that Dworkin argued (in “Hard Cases”) is 
incumbent on legislatures as well as courts.63 The doctrine of political responsibility implies that 
legislatures have an obligation to engage in coherent, responsible legislating with integrity (not 
precisely as coherent, responsible, and constrained as judging with integrity, but legislating with 
integrity nonetheless). And in Law=s Empire, Dworkin spoke of integrity in legislation as well as 
integrity in adjudication.64 Jeremy Waldron opens The Dignity of Legislation by suggesting that 
he aspires to do for legislation what Dworkin “purports to [have done] for adjudicative 
reasoning.”65 We interpret Waldron to mean that he aims to develop a conception of legislating 
with integrity, if not integrity in legislation.66 Admittedly, Dworkin himself did not do this. Nor 
for that matter has Waldron fully accomplished it. We view Sager=s idea of judicial 
underenforcement, coupled with his notion that legislatures have the obligation to enforce 
constitutional norms and seek constitutional justice, as furthering Dworkin=s unfinished business. 
For one thing, we should view legislatures as constrained by the Constitution outside the courts, 
not just as legislating in constitutionally gratuitous ways. For another, we should view 
legislatures as partners with courts in pursuing constitutional justice. Much work remains to be 
done in articulating a full-blown conception of legislating with responsibility and integrity as an 
aspect of the moral reading of the American Constitution.  
B. Perfecting the Substantive Constitution 
Third, we distinguish perfectionism in the sense of theories that interpret the American 
Constitution to secure or perfect the basic liberties that are preconditions for the legitimacy and 
trustworthiness of the outcomes of the political processes. John Hart Ely=s Aprocess-perfecting@ 
theory of reinforcing representative democracy, put forward in his book, Democracy and 
Distrust,67 is the most famous version of such a theory. According to Ely's theory, the American 
Constitution=s core commitment is to representative democracy, and judicial review is justified 
principally when the processes of representative democracy, and thus the political decisions 
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resulting from them, are undeserving of trust. Ely argues that courts should reinforce or perfect 
the procedural preconditions for the trustworthiness of the outcomes of the political processes, 
but that they should eschew protecting substantive liberties. 
Dworkin famously criticized Ely=s theory for taking a Aflight from substance@ to 
process,68 including fleeing protecting substantive liberties like an individual=s Afreedom to make 
ethical choices for himself@69 to protecting only procedural liberties like the right to vote. And he 
developed a substantive conception of constitutional democracy B or a Apartnership@ view B as an 
alternative to Ely=s procedural conception of majoritarian democracy. The partnership view of 
democracy holds that “the people govern themselves each as a full partner in a collective 
political enterprise so that a majority's decisions are democratic only when certain further 
conditions are met that protect the status and interests of each citizen as a full partner in that 
enterprise.”70 Majority support, just on its own, does not supply a “moral reason” for what the 
majority supports; ideas drawn from political morality about “justice, equality, and liberty” 
should inform our views about what is a democratic decision.71 Thus, A[t]he partnership 
conception ties democracy to the substantive constraints of legitimacy.@72 Dworkin is persuasive 
in contending that protection of, and respect for, rights that are the conditions for moral 
membership in our political community B rooted in equal concern and dignity B are themselves 
preconditions for the legitimacy of the outcomes of majoritarian political processes.73 Here 
Dworkin B despite his criticism of Ely B appears to have taken a page out of Ely=s book in 
conceiving our rights as Ademocratic conditions@ and in arguing that courts protecting 
constitutional rights guarantee democracy rather than compromise it. But unlike Ely, Dworkin 
would include, among the conditions of democracy, certain Asubstantive@ rights rooted in equal 
concern and dignity in addition to Aprocedural@ rights.74 
Dworkin has powerfully expressed the conditions of moral membership in our political 
community. But we would recast the architecture of his constitutional theory to differentiate it 
more sharply from that of Ely=s process-perfecting theory. Characterizing all of our substantive 
and procedural rights as Ademocratic conditions,@ as Dworkin does, may lead to unnecessary 
trouble and resistance. Many readers may resist his argument that substantive rights grounded in 
equal concern and dignity are Ademocratic conditions.@ They may suspect that Dworkin is pulling 
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a fast one or being too clever by packing all of the substantive rights that constrain majoritarian 
political processes into the Ademocratic conditions.@75 
One of us has sought to develop a substantive Constitution-perfecting theory as an 
alternative to the process-perfecting theory advanced by Ely.76 Such a theory would reinforce not 
only the procedural liberties (those related to democratic participation) but also the substantive 
liberties (those related to personal autonomy and ethical independence) embodied in the 
American Constitution and presupposed by its constitutional democracy. Securing Constitutional 
Democracy puts forward a guiding framework with two fundamental themes: first, securing the 
basic liberties that are preconditions for deliberative democracy, to enable citizens to apply their 
capacity for a conception of justice to deliberating about and judging the justice of basic 
institutions and social policies as well as the common good, and second, securing the basic 
liberties that are preconditions for deliberative autonomy, to enable citizens to apply their 
capacity for a conception of the good to deliberating about and deciding how to live their own 
lives. Together, these themes afford everyone the status of free and equal citizenship. They 
reflect two bedrock structures of deliberative political and personal self-government.77 Unlike 
process theories, this Constitution-perfecting theory provides a firm grounding for rights of 
privacy and autonomy, along with liberty of conscience and freedom of association, as necessary 
to secure individual freedom and to promote a diverse and vigorous civil society. This theory 
also shows how basic liberties associated with personal autonomy, along with those related to 
democratic participation, fit together into a coherent scheme of basic liberties and constitutional 
essentials that are integral to the American Constitution and its underlying constitutional 
democracy. The architecture of such a Constitution-perfecting theory can comfortably house all 
of what Dworkin conceives as the conditions of moral membership in our political community 
without recasting substantive liberties constraining majorities as Ademocratic conditions.@ On this 
theory, we perfect the whole substantive Constitution, not merely the partial procedural 
Constitution. 
Through offering this account of the moral shortfall of the moral reading and developing 
a substantive Constitution-perfecting theory, we aspire to make the moral reading of the 
American Constitution the best it can be. 
 
 
15 
NOTES 
 
1.Fleming is The Honorable Paul J. Liacos Professor of Law at Boston University School of Law. 
McClain is Professor of Law and Paul M. Siskind Research Scholar at Boston University School of 
Law. In this essay, we have drawn from previous pieces engaging with Ronald Dworkin=s work. 
2.Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977) 
(blurb on dust jacket). In this introduction, we draw from James E. Fleming, ARonald Dworkin: A 
Eulogy,@ http://balkin.blogspot.com/2013/02/ronald-dworkin-eulogy.html. 
3.T.M. Scanlon, APartisan For Life,@ in New York Review of Books, July 15, 1993, 45, 45 (reviewing 
Ronald Dworkin, Life=s Dominion (New York, NY: Knopf, 1993)). 
4.Ronald Dworkin, ADarwin=s New Bulldog,@ Harvard Law Review 111 (1998): 1718, reprinted in 
Ronald Dworkin, Justice in Robes (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), 75 (criticizing 
Posner); Ronald Dworkin, ABork=s Own Postmortem,@ in Ronald Dworkin, Freedom=s Law: The 
Moral Reading of the American Constitution (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), 
287 (criticizing Bork); Ronald Dworkin, AComment,@ in Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: 
Federal Courts and the Law, ed. Amy Gutmann (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), 
115 (criticizing Scalia). 
5.Ronald Dworkin, AThe Arduous Virtue of Fidelity: Originalism, Scalia, Tribe, and Nerve,@ 
Fordham Law Review 65 (1997): 1249, reprinted in Dworkin, Justice in Robes, 117; Ronald 
Dworkin, ARawls and the Law,@ Fordham Law Review 72 (2004): 1387, reprinted in Dworkin, 
Justice in Robes, 241; Ronald Dworkin, AJustice for Hedgehogs,@ Boston University Law Review 90 
(2010): 469. 
6.Ronald Dworkin, AResponse,@ Boston University Law Review 90 (2010): 1059. 
7.James E. Fleming, ARonald Dworkin,@ in The Yale Biographical Dictionary of American Law, ed. 
Roger K. Newman (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009), 178-79. 
8.That paper became Chapter 4, AMarriage Promotion, Marriage (E)quality, and Welfare Reform,@ in 
Linda C. McClain, The Place of Families: Fostering Capacity, Equality, and Responsibility 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), 117. 
9.James E. Fleming, Securing Constitutional Democracy: The Case of Autonomy (Chicago, IL: 
University of Chicago Press, 2006), 4-6, 73-74, 210-11. 
10.Sotirios A. Barber and James E. Fleming, Constitutional Interpretation: The Basic Questions 
(New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2007), xiii (quoting Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, 
149). 
11.James E. Fleming and Linda C. McClain, Ordered Liberty: Rights, Responsibilities, and Virtues 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013), 1-3. 
 
 
16 
 
12.James E. Fleming, Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution: For Moral Readings and Against 
Originalisms (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2015), xi, 3. 
13.Linda C. McClain, “Corporate Conscience and the Contraceptive Mandate: A Dworkinian 
Reading,” Journal of Law and Religion 30 (2015): 136. 
14.John Gardner, quoted in ARonald Dworkin, 1931-2013,@ http://www.law.ox.ac.uk/newsitem=537. 
15. Cass R. Sunstein, Radicals in Robes: Why Extreme Right-Wing Courts Are Wrong for America 
(New York, NY: Basic Books, 2005), 254 n.9 (citing John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York, 
NY: Columbia University Press, 1993)). 
16. See Sotirios A. Barber, Constitutional Failure (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 
2014), 5, 115; Sotirios A. Barber, Welfare and the Constitution (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 2003), 53-64, 118-42. 
17. See Michael J. Sandel, Justice: What=s the Right Thing to Do? (New York, NY: Farrar, Straus & 
Giroux, 2009). 
18. The Federalist No. 51, 322 (James Madison), ed. Clinton Rossiter (New York, NY: New 
American Library, 1961). 
19.Fleming and McClain, Ordered Liberty, 209. 
20.See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971); Rawls, 
Political Liberalism. In this section, we draw from Linda C. McClain and James E. Fleming, 
ARespecting Freedom and Cultivating Virtues in Justifying Constitutional Rights,@ Boston University 
Law Review 91 (2011): 1311, 1312-14. 
21.Sandel, Justice, 6-10, 19-21, 140-66. 
22.Ibid., 9. 
23.Ronald Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010), 263-
64, 267-68. 
24.Ibid., 1-19, 117-20. 
25. Ibid., 203-04. 
26. Ibid., 2 
27.Sandel, Justice, 140-66, 246-51. 
28.Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, 155, 186-88. 
 
 
17 
 
29.Sandel, Justice, 9, 12, 184-207. 
30. Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, 244. 
31.See Michael J. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (New York, NY: Cambridge 
University Press, 2d ed., 1998), 89-94, 175-83 (criticizing conception of the Aunencumbered self@); 
Michael J. Sandel, AMoral Argument and Liberal Toleration: Abortion and Homosexuality,@ 
California Law Review 77 (1989): 521, 522-25, 538 (criticizing liberal conceptions of autonomy as 
reflecting a Avoluntarist@ conception of the self). 
32.Sandel, Justice, 221. 
33.Ibid. (citing Alasdair MacIntrye, After Virtue (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 
1981)). 
34.See James E. Fleming, ATaking Responsibilities as well as Rights Seriously,@ Boston University 
Law Review 90 (2010): 839, 839, 844 (analyzing Dworkin, Life=s Dominion, and Dworkin, Justice 
for Hedgehogs); Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, 482 n.7, and Dworkin, AResponse,@ 1078-79 
(indicating that Dworkin carries forward the arguments about taking responsibilities seriously from 
Life=s Dominion to Justice for Hedgehogs). 
35.Fleming, ATaking Responsibilities as well as Rights Seriously,@ 839-40. 
36.Sandel, AMoral Argument and Liberal Toleration,@ 533-38.  
37.See William Galston, Liberal Purposes: Goods, Virtues, and Diversity in the Liberal State 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); William Galston, Liberal Pluralism: The 
Implications of Value Pluralism for Political Theory and Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003); Stephen Macedo, Liberal Virtues: Citizenship, Virtue, and Community in 
Liberal Constitutionalism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990); Stephen Macedo, Diversity and 
Distrust: Civic Education in a Multicultural Democracy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2000). 
38.Fleming and McClain, Ordered Liberty, 3-4. 
39.Dworkin, Life=s Dominion, 150. In this section, we incorporate portions of Fleming, ATaking 
Responsibilities as well as Rights Seriously,@ 840-43. See also Benjamin C. Zipursky and James E. 
Fleming, ARights, Responsibilities, and Reflections on the Sanctity of Life,@ in Ronald Dworkin, ed. 
Arthur Ripstein (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 109, 127-30.  
40.See Scanlon, APartisan For Life,@ 46, 47.  
41.See, e.g., Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, xv, 269; Robin West, AForeword: Taking Freedom 
Seriously,@ Harvard Law Review 104 (1990): 43, 46-47 (criticizing Dworkin=s Aliberal legalist@ 
strategy of Ataking rights seriously@ and proposing instead a Aresponsibility-based liberalism@ that 
 
 
18 
 
would Atake seriously not only the individual=s demand for rights but also the burdens of his 
responsibility@).  
42.See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 8 (1967) (describing one of the state appellate court=s 
rationales for upholding Virginia=s miscegenation statute as Apreserving the racial integrity of its 
citizens@ (citation omitted)).  
43.Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, 370-71. 
44.Dworkin, Life=s Dominion, 151. 
45.Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), 65-
66; Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 272-73. 
46.See Fleming, Securing Constitutional Democracy, 61-85; Rawls, Political Liberalism, 15-20, 29-
35, 299-304. See also McClain, The Place of Families, 4, 17-19, 64-67; Fleming and McClain, 
Ordered Liberty, 3-4, 9-10, 94, 111, 151. 
47.See Fleming and McClain, Ordered Liberty, 62-68 (analyzing Dworkin, Life=s Dominion). 
Dworkin made these arguments with respect to the right to abortion and the right to die. It is not 
clear whether he would take the same view regarding governmental moralizing with respect to all 
constitutional rights, for example, freedom of speech and religious liberty. 
48. Sunstein, Radicals in Robes, 32; see Fleming, Securing Constitutional Democracy, 16, 211, 225. 
49. Sunstein, Radicals in Robes, 32 (quoting Ronald Dworkin, Law=s Empire (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1986), 229). 
50. Fleming, Securing Constitutional Democracy, 5, 24, 63, 84; see Dworkin, Law=s Empire, 239; 
Cass R. Sunstein, ASecond-Order Perfectionism,@ Fordham Law Review 75 (2007), 2867, 2869-70, 
2872-74. 
51.Dworkin, Freedom=s Law, 1-38; Dworkin, Life=s Dominion, 118-47. In this section, we 
incorporate portions of James E. Fleming, AJudicial Review without Judicial Supremacy: Taking the 
Constitution Seriously Outside the Courts,@ Fordham Law Review 73 (2005): 1377, 1381-86.  
52.See, e.g., Henry P. Monaghan, AOur Perfect Constitution,@ New York University Law Review 56 
(1981): 353. 
53.See, e.g., Christopher L. Eisgruber, AShould Constitutional Judges Be Philosophers?,@ in 
Exploring Law=s Empire: The Jurisprudence of Ronald Dworkin, ed. Scott Hershovitz (New York, 
NY: Oxford University Press, 2006), 5. 
54.For such moral realist accounts, see, for example, Sotirios A. Barber, The Constitution of Judicial 
Power (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993); and Michael S. Moore, AJustifying 
 
 
19 
 
the Natural Law Theory of Constitutional Interpretation,@ Fordham Law Review 69 (2001): 2087. 
55.See Dworkin, Freedom=s Law, 10-11; Dworkin, Law=s Empire, 238-75. 
56.See Dworkin, Freedom=s Law, 36. In this paragraph we draw upon James E. Fleming, 
ALawrence=s Republic,@ Tulsa Law Review 39 (2004): 563, 581. 
57.See Dworkin, Freedom=s Law, 36 (citing Frank I. Michelman, AForeword: On Protecting the Poor 
Through the Fourteenth Amendment,@ Harvard Law Review 83 (1969): 7). 
58.Lawrence G. Sager, Justice in Plainclothes: A Theory of American Constitutional Practice (New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004), 84-128. 
59.See ibid., 84-88. 
60.See ibid., 95-102. 
61.Dworkin, Freedom=s Law, 73. 
62.Sager, Justice in Plainclothes, 129-60; see also Lawrence G. Sager, AThe Why of Constitutional 
Essentials,@ Fordham Law Review 72 (2004): 1421, 1423-29 (using concentric circles to illustrate 
these four domains). 
63.See Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, 87. 
64.See Dworkin, Law=s Empire, 167, 176-84, 217-28. 
65.See Jeremy Waldron, The Dignity of Legislation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999), 1. 
66.See Jeremy Waldron, ALegislating with Integrity,@ Fordham Law Review 72 (2003), 373, 373 
(distinguishing between legislating with integrity and integrity in legislation). 
67.John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980), 73-
104. In this section, we incorporate passages from James E. Fleming, AThe Place of History and 
Philosophy in the Moral Reading of the American Constitution,@ in Exploring Law=s Empire: The 
Jurisprudence of Ronald Dworkin, 23, 27-30. 
68.Ronald Dworkin, AThe Forum of Principle,@ New York University Law Review 56 (1981): 469, 
reprinted in Dworkin, A Matter of Principle, 33. 
69. Ronald Dworkin, Is Democracy Possible Here? (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
2006), 146. 
70. Ibid., 131. See also Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, 382-85. 
 
 
20 
 
71. Dworkin, Is Democracy Possible Here?, 134. 
72.Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, 384. 
73.Dworkin, Freedom=s Law, 24; Dworkin, Life=s Dominion, 123; Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, 
384-85. 
74.Dworkin, Freedom=s Law, 24-26, 349 n.5; Dworkin. Is Democracy Possible Here?, 144, 146; 
Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, 384-85. 
75.Sager has made a similar critique of the architecture of Dworkin=s theory. See Sager, Justice in 
Plainclothes, 132-37. 
76.See Fleming, Securing Constitutional Democracy, 19-36 (criticizing the process-perfecting 
theory defended in Ely, Democracy and Distrust). 
77.Ibid., 3-4. 
